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INTRODUCTION

A. The State, the Nation, and the Ethnic Group

The concept of a nation explicitly has only a minor role in the law. The
reason is that the nation, unlike the state, is not, for the most part, a 'legal
person.' In other words, typically states rather than nations pass laws,
conclude treaties and violate them.' The nation, therefore, is a community
defined by culture and political life rather than by law.2
*
Professor of Philosophy at the Abo Academy in Abo, Finland; Lecturer of Philosophy
at the University of Wales at Swansea, UK from 1992-98; Abo Academy and the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; Author of Trust: The Tacit Demand (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998);
Contributor to Philosophy,Philosophical Investigation, PhilosophicalPsychology, Inquiry, Bioethics, and a number of journals in Swedish and Finnish. I am grateful to Prof. Lars Hertzberg
and Prof. Margaret Moore for comments on the manuscript. Earlier versions were presented at
the Philosophy Research Seminars at Abo Academy and at the University of Turku. This work
has received financial support from the Ragnar, Ester, Rolf and Margareta Bergbom Fund.
1.
In the late 18th century, treaties were concluded between the U.S. government and
Indian nations (I owe this point to Prof. Jordan Paust). Rather than signifying a doctrine about
nations as legal persons, however, this might reflect the unwillingness of the U.S. to recognize
the other contracting party as a government-at a time when the meaning of the word 'nation'
was (even) less clearly defined than it is now. In more recent legal discourse, nations have typically been treated as cultural or regional entities with a potential right to self-determination, i.e.,
to statehood. Nations exist independently of state boundaries, but "it should be recalled ... that
in the legal discourse the only claim that a nation can have is that of right to self-determination,
whose implications, especially in multi-ethnic states, have a rather weak if not non-existent
status." Kaj-Henrik Impola, Destiny or Choice? A Study on the Concept of Nation 19 (1997)
(unpublished LL. Lic. thesis, on file with the University of Turku) (citing Richard T. De
George, The Myth of the Right of Collective Self-Determination, in ISSUES OF SELF-

DETERMINATION

3 (William Twining ed., 1991).

2.
Typically, in legal reasoning notions not originally invented by lawyers are translated into legal concepts. For instance, the law will define the family in certain ways. Legal
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However, this is not the whole story. The concept of a nation has
been a central part of the dynamics of ideas that, particularly during the
last two centuries, paved the way for the creation of the modem state and
its legal institutions. Even today, the legitimacy of modem states is
closely related to the fact that they are seen as embodiments of particular
nations.
The crucial link between the nation and the state is the idea of popular sovereignty. The sovereign, the ultimate source of the laws, is neither
God nor a monarch but rather the nation, a community whose members
are united horizontally by cultural and political ties. With this idea, earlier political units such as empires and dynastic states lost their
legitimacy. They were broken up, absorbed into emerging nation-states,
or reconstituted as nation-states.3
The generalization of the principle of popular sovereignty entails
that each individual people, or nation, should at least be accorded the
right to create a state of its own-even if this does not rule out multinational, autonomous, or federal states. However, it invokes the often
controversial question of exactly who belongs to the same nation. In particular, there is the question of what role ethnic distinctions should have.
Ethnicity, nationality, and statehood are closely linked in their present form. This is due to their common roots in the idea of popular
sovereignty, as it has been understood in the Western world for the last
two-hundred years. One consequence of this is that the distinction in
principle between ethnic and civic nationalism, or between political and
cultural nationalism, may to some degree be a red herring. Even ethnicity is in part politically constituted. On the other hand, this means that
there is a risk of misunderstanding when these concepts are applied outside their original context of European modernity.
The paper will include three parts. In the first part, the relation between nationality and popular sovereignty is explored. In the second
part, there is a somewhat analogous discussion of the concept of ethnicity. In the last part, the conclusions are applied in a discussion of ethnic
nationalism.

and social definitions of the family may in fact pick out different groups of people. Yet the
definitions are sufficiently close for us to say that the one is an approximation of the other.
The typical role of the concept of a nation might then be described in two ways. Either
we can say that the sovereign state, or 'nation-state,' is a legal approximation of the cultural
and political concept of a nation. Or we might also say that the place that a concept of the
nation might occupy in the law is, for most purposes, already 'filled up' by the concept of a

state.
3.
Examples: Austria-Hungary (an empire that was broken up); Prussia, Naples (dynastic states absorbed into the German and Italian nations); China, Luxembourg (an empire
and a dynastic state reconstituted as nation-states).
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONALITY
AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

A. PopularSovereignty and Political Culture
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is considered a founding father of modem
nationalism. The actual word 'nation' does not have a prominent place in
his writings, but he formulated some of the key issues to which the con4
cept of national belonging purports to provide the answer.
Rousseau's analysis of the ideal society in his Social Contract implies that the citizens of a society must have a certain mindset, or
political culture, in order for popular sovereignty to be possible They
must engage in political life, not because they expect personal gain, but
because they care deeply about the good of their society as a whole.6
Rousseau also expressed this point with the apparent paradox that the
citizen in his ideal society consents to all the laws, including those that
are passed in spite of his opposition. If I end up on the losing side in a
vote, the result "proves nothing more than that I made a mistake and that
what I took to be the general will was not."7 This sounds outrageousand Rousseau was surely aware of this.
In order to understand Rousseau one needs to consider his key concept, the general will.' By distinguishing between "the general will" and
"the will of all," Rousseau makes a conceptual point that can be put in
the following way: One can raise meaningful questions about what a
group wants, as a group, only if the deliberation that takes place within
the group has a certain character. The individual members must address
the issues at hand from the perspective that they think is that of the group
as a whole. 9 Otherwise, it will be misleading to say that the group, rather
than some of its individual members, wants this or that.' A vote becomes
4.
I have argued more fully elsewhere for the thesis that representative legitimacy and
nationhood are internally related. Ollie Lagerspetz, On National Belonging, in NATIONALISM
AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 57 (Nenad Miscevic ed., 2000) [hereinafter Lagerspetz].
5.
See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 112-16, 142-52 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
[hereinafter ROUSSEAU 1997]; see also ROUSSEAU, Discourse on Political Economy, in BASIC
POLITICAL WRITINGS 119-127 (Hackett ed., 1987).
6.
ROUSSEAU 1997, supra note 5, at 113-16, 121-22.
7.
Id. bk. IV, ch. 2, at 122-25.
8.
Id. bk. II, ch.2, at 58-59.
9.
Id. bk. I, ch. 4, at 44-48.
10.
Id. bk. IV, ch. I, at 121-22. Rousseau is not entirely clear here, however. He says
two things: (1) The general will "considers only the general interest" while the will of all,
which is "merely" the sum of private wills, "considers private interests." On the other hand,
(2) "But remove from these same [private] wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other
out, and what remains as the sum of the differences is the general will." This might be read as
implying that the general will after all is the sum of private wills. It is the common element
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an expression of the general will when the voters "express their opinions
as citizens" about what is "advantageous to the state," i.e., to society."
"The general will" is currently not part of our standard political vocabulary; but the idea itself is deeply embedded in the practices of
modem democracies. In a modem democracy, a citizen is expected to
agree that his or her tax money may be used for education, health care,
or defense, even if he does not count among the immediate beneficiaries.
He may have voted against it, but he recognizes that the collective decision is legitimate.
Now one can see why the idea of national belonging is a natural answer to demands inherent in democratic decision-making. It is
important, in order for the constraints that democracy imposes on individual choice to be justifiable, that the political community should strike
its members as natural. Citizens2 should see it as a normally unquestioned framework of their action.'
B. The Nation as Shared Space
Alasdair Maclntyre quotes the Australian philosopher John Anderson as urging us "not to ask of a social institution: 'What end or purpose
does it serve?' but rather, 'Of what conflicts is it the scene?'
This remark (originally made in a different context) is illuminating here. It is
profitable to think of the nation as a scene of conflict and interaction, a
shared space in which political, cultural and economic activities take
place.
Even from an avowedly nationalistic point of view, the great
achievement of the nation-builders of the last few centuries was not that
of inculcating love of country in us. Rather it consisted of making the
nation so well entrenched in our thinking that it is often invisible. The
nation has become the self-evident scene of much of our thinking. When
we speak of health care, or education, or foreign policies, there may be
"'3

that remains when conflicting interests in a society have 'cancelled each other out.' However,
see again in bk. IV,ch. II at 124: "When a law is proposed in the People's assembly, what they
are being asked is not exactly whether they approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it
does or does not conform to the general will, which is theirs." Finally in bk. IV, ch. 1, at 122:
"[T]he general will grows mute" when "everyone ... no more states opinions as a Citizen than
if the State had never existed, and iniquitous decrees with no other goal than particular interest
are falsely passed under the name of Laws."
11.
Id. bk. IV, ch. I, at 122 (emphasis added). Rousseau does not clearly distinguish
between state and society. The 'state' is, in Rousseau's terminology, the body politic (the nation) as a whole while 'government' includes the administrative apparatus only. Id. bk. III, ch.

I, at 87-88.
12.

13.
1984).

See Lagerspetz, supra note 4, at 57-74.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 163 (2d. ed.
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deep disagreements. But we will not be disagreeing about which country's health care, education, and foreign policies are at issue. It is
assumed that "we" must settle these questions collectively, as a nation,
for the nation.
It would indeed be unrealistic to describe my relation to most of my
co-nationals as one of mutual love. Indeed, if I were required to name
persons whom I hate, the chances are that most of them would be members of my own nation (the Finns). Moreover, if a Finnish politician is
included on my list of hate objects, the fact that he is Finnishwill not be
a mitigating circumstance. One reason for my adverse feelings would be
exactly the fact that he has something to do with me. As Philippa Foot
points out, you cannot intelligibly profess that you are proud of the sky
or the sea unless a very special explanation is produced." Similarly, I am
proud, or ashamed, or embarrassed, by what Finnish politicians do because I am Finnish.
Thus my national belonging does not imply specific attitudes towards my co-nationals. It involves a shared space within which my
agreement and disagreement with them take place.
It is well known that 'the shared spaces' of modern nations are to a
large extent a result of conscious nation-building. The message of nation-building was that the shared space that mattered politically was
neither, for instance, the socially exclusive but geographically extended
space of the aristocracy, nor just one's particular region, town, or street.
The main function of the nation, thus, is not to furnish an object for
someone's love or hatred, but to provide a shared space for political and
cultural life.
C. The Creationof Symbolic Place
The bottom line is that a political space remains shared as long as
there are people who in fact treat it as shared; that is, as long as there are
important issues that we address as shared concerns. But the statement,
"there is shared political space if there are people who treat it as shared,"
runs the risk of circularity.'- Exactly what do the members of the group
share? And who are the members? These questions are interdependent,
because the group consists of those who share the same political space;
and political space is defined as space that is shared by all group members. A political debate, unless it is frightfully thin, will presuppose
14.
Philippa Foot, Moral Beliefs, in THEORIES OF ETHICS 83, 86 (Philippa Foot ed.,
1967).
15.
A similar circularity is involved in the definition, 'a nation is a collection of people
who think they are a nation.' It does not answer the original question: What does it mean to
think that something is a nation?
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independent answers to questions about who "we" are. This calls for a
political culture generally rooted in the language(s), symbols, and ways
of life of a community; life in work and play, friendship, and family.
As Benedict Anderson argued, nation-building was made possible,
and perhaps inevitable, by the emergence of mass media and a public
who read it.'6 Up until the late eighteenth century, it was usually agreed
that the republican form of government was only possible in city states
and other small-scale societies.'7 According to Aristotle, popular participation in government was only possible if the citizens could know each
others' characters; in a city where one herald could be heard by all.'8 The
emergence of mass media extended radically the range of those whom
"the same herald" could reach. Readers of the same novels and newspapers were, as Anderson famously remarked, forged into "imagined
communities." They did not personally know each other but they could
relate to the same written material, conscious of the fact that there would
be others reading the same thing at the same time.
Mass media thus created an imaginatively shared space of places,
people, and ideas. Once this imagined space was in place it could be engineered by nation-builders. Music, works of art, school textbooks, and
depictions of historical events have provided emerging national lives
with such 'imaginary commons." 9
One very striking example is the use of physical places as symbols
of the nation as a whole. 0 It was brought home to the reading public that
the place they were from was a nation or a country 2' -not strictly a place
but a more or less abstract entity.
16.

See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN

AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM

17.

CHARLES

passim (1983).

DE SECONDAT,

BARON

DE MONTESQUIEU,

CONSIDERATIONS

ON

THE

91-96 (David Lowenthal
trans., The Free Press 1965) (1734); ROUSSEAU 1997, supra note 5, bk. III, ch. III at 89-90.
18.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 199 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1998).
19.
See, e.g., STEN DAHLSTEDT & SVEN-ERIC LIEDMAN, NATIONALISMENS LOGIK
(1996); Etienne Franqois & Hagen Schulze, Das emotionale Fundament der Nation, in
CAUSES OF THE GREATNESS OF THE ROMANS AND THEIR DECLINE

MYTHEN DER NATIONEN: EIN EUROPAISCHES PANORAMA

17-32

(Monika Flacke ed.,

1998);

Stefan Germer, Retrovision: Die riickblickende Entfindung der Nationen durch Kunst, in
MYTHEN DER NATIONEN: EIN EUROPAISCHES PANORAMA 33-52 (Monika Flacke ed., 1998).
20.
Etienne Franqois & Hagen Schulze, Einleitung, in DEUTSCHE ERINNERUNGSORTE

9, 9-24 (Franqois & Schulze ed., 2001); Pyrs Gruffudd, Heritageas NationalIdentity: Histories and Prospects of the National Past, in HERITAGE, TOURISM, AND SOCIETY 49, 49-67
(David Herbert ed., 1995); Pierre Nora, General Introduction: Between Memory and History,
in REALMS OF MEMORY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH PAST 1-23 (Lawrence Kritzman
ed., 1996); Petri Raivo, Historiallisetmaisemat ja maantieteellinen muisti. Nakokulmia sotahistoriansijainnilliseenrepresentaatioon,in PAIKAN HEUASTUKSIA 141-63 (Raine Mantysalo
ed., 2004).
21.
For Jane Austen, "country" still just means county. Hence, for the gentry that Austen writes about, to live in the country is to live in one's estate in some rural county.
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"Patriotism" meant originally love of one's "patria," i.e., of one's
place of origin.22 In antiquity, it would not be a sentiment associated with
the Roman Empire as a whole but only with some city within it. This is
no doubt connected to the difficulty in comprehending a large and variegated stretch of inhabited land as one place. Even if there is actually no
definition of what constitutes a place, there is obviously an upper limit to
its size.
Yi-Fu Tuan points out in his work on topophilia, or love of place,
that we cannot actually visualize the U.S. except as a shape on a map.23
He suggests, on the other hand (perhaps implausibly), that Shakespeare's
England was still sufficiently small to count as a "patria" in the classical
sense.
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall
Or a moat defensive to a house
Against the envy of less happier lands,
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England...24
The connection of patriotism to physical place obviously presented a
problem to modem nation-builders. The solution was to set apart (and
sometimes actually build) particular sites that were to stand proxy for the
whole nation.25 Student societies and school classes would arrange
trips. 6 Others would see pictures in illustrated magazines. A common
experience of place would give the nation a tangible reality. Thus Americans supposedly "come from" the Statue of Liberty (and now also from
Ground Zero), Serbs from the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, and Swedes
from the outdoor museum of Skansen.
It is important that we should be skeptical of this kind of cultural
engineering. However, the very existence of imagined communities
makes it inevitable that the members will think of their community in
terms of some shared points of reference. Even in general, the media
22.

Yi-Fu TUAN, TOPoPHILIA: A STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION, ATTITUDES,

AND VALUES 100 (1990)

[hereinafter TUAN].
23.
Id. at 15.
24.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 2, sc. 1., quoted in TUAN at 101. One may
ask what difference it makes that one would, in Shakespeare's time, almost invariably approach England from the sea. At first sight England would present itself as a tangible 'place'
in the horizon. (This suggestion was made by Lars Hertzberg.)
25.

See generally DEUTSCHE ERINNERUNGSORTE (Franqois & Schulze ed., 2001).

BILLY EHN, JONAS FRYKMAN, & ORVAR LbFGREN, FORSVENSKNINGEN AV SVERIGE: DET NATIONELLAS FORVANDLINGAR

(1993).

26.
Georg Kreis, Nationalpddagogikin Wort und Bild, in MYTHEN DER NATIONEN: EIN
EUROPISCHES PANORAMA 446, 448-49 (Monika Flacke ed., 1998).
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tend to create communities of users. MTV, traditional "High Culture,"
and other forms of cultural communication address themselves to
selected audiences to the exclusion of others. We should, however, be
conscious of the processes through which unifying symbols are selected
and what they imply about the relation between members and nonmembers.
If Kosovo Polje is singled out as the birth place of the Serbian nation, and if the battle that occurred in 1389 is (inaccurately) described as
a clash between Islam and Orthodox Christianity, there will be the additional message that Muslims are not fully acceptable as members of a
Serbian nation. The Statue of Liberty is, in comparison, a benign symbol. It stands for a country that welcomes immigrants and outsiders. Yet
as a symbol it excludes Native Americans who never arrived in the country as immigrants.27 On the other hand, Mexico has capitalized on the
memories of its pre-Columbian civilizations. But this interest tends to
focus on their achievements as builders of cities and empires. 28 Thus the
cult of the indigenous serves to highlight the distance between official
Mexico and its present, rural indigenous population.29
In sum, nation building involves creating a code of symbols that tries
to address every member of the nation, plus an education that makes everyone conversant with its symbols. One complication is that ethnic,
indigenous, regional or other minorities may find it difficult to identify
with the official nationalisms of their countries.
In its present form the nation is a necessary corollary to the idea of
popular sovereignty. But the nation is not merely a political (as opposed
to cultural) entity. This is because, in the context of a civil society, a
shared cultural space will also be the prerequisite of a meaningful political life.
II. THE

CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY

A. Ethnicity as a Political Concept
Ethnicity, too, is a political phenomenon in a broad sense of the
word. In other words, ethnicity concerns ways in which human groups
are organized. At the same time, ethnicity is not political as opposed to
27.
People were moving back and forth on the North American continent already before
the arrival of Europeans. My description thus tacitly assumes a qualitative difference between
these and later population movements.
28.
See Katri Pirttijarvi, Intiaani kiisitteena in KENEN AMERIKKA? 500 VUOTTA LATINALAISEN AMERIKAN VALLOITUSTA 115 (Jussi Pakkasvirta & Teivo Teivainen eds., 1992).
29.
JUDITH FRIEDLANDER, BEING INDIAN IN HUEYAPAN: A STUDY OF FORCED IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 130(1975); Pirttijarvi, supra note 28, at 113-27.
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cultural. This is because of the close conceptual links between the notions of culture and group membership.
This relation between culture and group membership cuts both ways.
People whose culture is similar will easily associate in groups. But more
interestingly, definitions of what counts as similar, or as one culture as
opposed to many, or as sharing a culture-these definitions themselves
express ideas about who are counted as members of the same group.
The Norwegian social scientist Thomas Hylland Eriksen points out
that the nobles of the ancien regime would have found it absurd to suggest that they shared a culture with peasants.30 A generation later, that
idea would come to some of them as a revelation. But the question
whether aristocrats and peasants actually participated in the same culture
involves the normative question of the relative value and "naturalness" of
different kinds of association between people.
Contemporary research on ethnicity treats ethnicity primarily as a
principle of social organization." Eriksen defines ethnicity in the following way:
Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who
consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of
other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a social identity (based on
contrast vis-A-vis others) characterised by metaphoric or fictive
kinship [..

.].

When cultural differences regularly make a differ-

ence in interaction between members of groups, the social
relationship has an ethnic element. In this way it has a political,
organisational aspect as well as a symbolic one.32
Thus if someone speaks of an 'ethnic' cultural feature he means something that is (1) an 'inherited' part of someone's way of life (hence
Eriksen's reference to metaphoric kinship) and which, above all, (2) is
supposed to furnish a basis for distinctions between groups of people.
The introduction of a third criterion, however, is necessary in order
to distinguish between ethnic groups and social classes or castes.33 By
30.

THOMAS HYLLAND ERIKSEN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM 101

31.

MARCUS BANKS, ETHNICITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS (1996); Eriksen,

(1993).

supra note 30; ROOTS AND RITUALS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES (T. Dekker,
J. Helsloot & C. Wijlers eds., 2000) [hereinafter ROOTS AND RITUALS].
32.
ERIKSEN, supra note 30, at 12-13.
33.
Class differences in general tend to breed cultural distinctions and they are to some
extent inherited. On the other hand, some ethnic classifications also imply social class and
may indeed come close to a caste system (e.g., 'indio' in Latin America; 'gypsies' and 'immigrants' in Europe). On the other hand, there are historical examples of how a caste distinction
turns into an ethnic distinction. See BANKS, supra note 31, at 164-65 (discussing the case of
Rwanda).
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definition, classes constitute parts of a more complex society. One may
imagine a classless society but not a society with just one class. In contrast, it is not difficult to imagine a complete society that is ethnically
homogeneous. 4 Thus we should add: (3) To call a group "ethnic" is to
imply that, in the right conditions, it might imaginably turn itself into a
complete society, i.e., a nation. This is not to suggest that most ethnic
groups in fact will, or ought to, constitute themselves as nations. This
point, however, highlights the tension between nation building and ethnic mobilization.
The definition of ethnicity suggested here implies in fact that some
cultural feature of a group may become ethnic or lose its ethnic character. Ethnic divisions emerge and they may even be consciously created
(or revitalized) when a cultural feature is invested with political significance. " In addition to nation building, one may speak of minority
building. This means the striving to consolidate a cultural group as a political force and a potential partner in negotiations with the state. These
remarks, however, do not imply that ethnic identities are arbitrarily chosen or faked even if it is true that in a given case they may become
matters of debate.
Such debates may centre on two issues.36 These questions are
distinct; at the same time, however, the success of an assumed ethnic
group in securing an affirmative answer to either one will provide
arguments in favor of a similar answer to the other. The first question is:
Is the envisaged social identity a viable one? Put differently, is it able to
assert itself and gain legitimacy as the basis of a community, or as a
genuine minority, in its own right? The other question is whether the
relevant group is justified in its claim to distinctness.
The former is to some extent a factual question because it concerns
the amount of available resources. The latter question can neither be answered on purely factual grounds nor a priori. It means asking whether a
supposedly ethnic division in a given case is ethnic. In other words, one
needs to ask whether a division described as ethnic makes sufficient difference in the real life of a society. How often, and on what kinds of
occasions, does it influence group relations? But the answer may also

34.
However, as Eriksen points out, in order for the word 'ethnicity' to be applicable
there must still be a contrast between this society and a neighbouring one with which it has
regular contacts. ERIKSEN, supra note 30, at 12.
35.
Marjut Anttonen, Ethnic Revitalization and the Politics of Identity among Finnish
and Kven Minorities in Northern Norway, in ROOTS AND RITUALS 37-52 (2000). The author
describes the emergence of 'ethnopolitics' in northern Norway. Also see other contributions to
the same volume.
36.
This was pointed out to the present author by Prof. Lars Hertzberg.
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imply a political stand about what kinds of difference one holds as sufficiently important.
One's Protestant or Catholic faith defines one's ethnic identity in
Northern Ireland 37 but not in other parts of the U.K. Why is Catholicism,
then, ethnic in Northern Ireland but not elsewhere in Britain? Clearly
this has to do with the political role of the religious division, especially
the differential treatment of the two groups in the past by the English
state. For this reason denominations have as a matter of fact become a
main organizing principle across a large spectrum of the social life of
Northern Ireland.38
Maps are now published where the territory of Iraq is divided into
three parts defined as Kurd, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim. Will it be
realistic to see each of these divisions as ethnic, as in Northern Ireland?
While Kurds have actually fought for self-determination, demands for
territorial autonomy by either the Shia or the Sunni are seemingly nonexistent. Might it be more correct to draw the distinction between the
two Muslim denominations as an analogy of, say, that between Protestants and Catholics in Germany? To find the answer one would need to
study exactly on what kinds of occasions the inhabitants perceive themselves as belonging to separate groups.
B. Objective and Subjective Ethnicity

The definition of ethnicity that I have described contrasts with some
practices of earlier generations of ethnologists. In what was the dominant approach well into the twentieth century, ethnicity was considered a
combination of objective traits of individuals-attributes that would infallibly pigeonhole their bearers into peoples, tribes, or races. Indeed it
seems that many recent philosophical discussions of ethnic nationalism
still tacitly assume exactly this. 9
The identification of ethnicity with common individual attributes or
shared descent frequently created difficulties. It was often hard to find a
distinctive trait common to all the group members. Not all Basques of
Spain and France really speak Euskara (the Basque language) and not all
Catholics of Northern Ireland believe in Transubstantiation, the Assumption, and the infallibility of the Pope. Facts like this sometimes motivate
skepticism about how genuine these, or other, group identities really are.
Sometimes anthropologists would circumvent difficulties by claiming
37.
38.

BANKS,

supra note 31, at 42.

Rosanne Cecil, The Marching Season in Northern Ireland: An Expression of Politic-Religious Identity, in INSIDE EUROPEAN IDENTITIES 146-66 (Sharon McDonald ed., 1993).
39.
LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 11 (1992); PER
BAUHN, NATIONALISM AND MORALITY 16(1995).
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that some members of the groups they were studying had lost their genuine identity due to mixed marriages or external influences. Then they
would simply describe the presumed characteristics of the unadulterated
racial type.4O
If ethnicity concerns patterns of social organization-and not the
possession of cultural traits by individuals-such complexities will be
less disquieting. On this view language, religion, etc. rather constitute
centres of gravity for the members' cultural orientation.
This highlights the fact that 'culture' is never, in any case, something
into which you are just born. Just as a Christian believer would not call
herself Christian merely because she is born of Christian parents, culture
is not passively owned. It literally means the cultivation of one's skills,
knowledge, judgment, and other faculties." A human being receives a
culture as his inheritance but will never actually come into the active
possession of it all. Perhaps someone (say, a Finn) wants to know how to
iron shirts, repair a window frame, or read Latin. He must learn these
things, but they are also in some sense part of the Finnish-cum-European
culture to which he already belongs. Here to say that it is his culture
means that he accepts it as a standard by which he judges his own
achievements.
Similarly, to be part of the Basque culture involves treating Euskara,
and the cultural life that goes with it, as a centre of one's cultural gravity.
The survival of Euskara as a spoken language will be a natural concern
even for Basques who do not speak it as their first language.
It is illuminating now to think once more about the analogy that is
frequently drawn between ethnicity and kinship. In the present article,
ethnicity has been described as a quasi-political, and thus in some sense
voluntary, form of association. One may feel that such an emphasis will
weaken the hold of the kinship analogy. It would be easier to see the
connection between ethnicity and kinship if one held onto the nineteenth
century association between ethnicity and race as a biological category.
It can be argued, however, that the traditional view misrepresents not
only ethnicity but kinship as well. Kinship is not a biological, but a social category. Rousseau captures this when he notes that you can
meaningfully say that ancient men lived in families only if you are refer-

40.
See, e.g. 1II THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 487 (11th ed., 1910) (definition of
'Basques'); XIX THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 344 (11th ed., 1910) (definition of 'Negro'); see also JAMES G. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH 177 (MacMillan Company 1923)
(distinguishing between 'the true negro culture' and 'the disturbed negro form of society').
41.
See, II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1248 (1933) (defining 'culture' as 'cultivating or development (of the mind, faculties, manners, etc.); improvement by education and
training.'
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ring 2to the period after social' relations were established between fami4
lies.

Consider the family as a primordial unit. Biologically, one remains
the child of one's parents whatever happens. However, the family itself is
a social institution. Families break up and recombine. Family ties-for
instance, the status of in-laws, stepchildren, boyfriends, and cousinswill be understood differently in different societies and in the minds of
different individuals.
Traditional views on ethnicity among scholars were no doubt influenced by the particular situation on the European continent. European
ethnic units often later developed into nations. This created a need to
determine the ethnic character of contested regions and individuals.43
Scholarly classifications were fed back into popular thought and then
back again into academia--or perhaps rather, the people concerned made
use of them in their search for political identity.' What ethnic identity
now in fact means, is a result of this interaction between scholars and
popular political consciousness.
In many areas outside Europe, the situation is different. Classifications by scholars do not necessarily match the actual experiences of
those concerned. Many ethnic groups only exist in the minds of ethnologists. 45 There is nothing to guarantee that the classifying features that

ethnologists would select as crucial are so perceived by the population.
For instance, a map of the languages of Mexico does not necessarily
say much about what the people of a particular locality in Mexico think
about themselves.
The Tzotzil are described as one of the many ethnic groups of
Southern Mexico. In their relations with outsiders, however, the persons
concerned would typically identify themselves not as Tzotzil but as people of a particular locality (such as the municipality of San Pedro). In
other cases they would classify themselves as farmers (campesinos).
Outsiders might call them "Indians" (indios), but then typically with the
intention of marking them off as backward and uneducated. The Tzotzil
anthropologist Jacinto Arias describes himself first of all as an inhabitant
of San Pedro, but also as a "Highlander," belonging to a larger humanity
42.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS 25, 49 n. 12 (Hackett ed., 1987).
43.
Thus ethnicity was supposed to be a guiding principle for the Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, and S~vres treaties in 1919-20. It was also invoked in subsequent demands of
revision.
44.
The role of scholars was particularly conspicuous in the 'national awakenings'
taking place in nineteenth-century Eastern and Central Europe. See ANDERSON, supra note 16,
at 66-79.
45.
ERIKSEN, supra note 30, at 87-88.
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of Highlanders.4 6 On the other hand, the situation might change for various reasons. For example, if indigenous communities are granted
collective ownership of particular lands, there may be a need for new
definitions of membership.
III. ETHNIC NATIONALISM
A. Ethnicity vs. Consent
There are close similarities between the concepts, or logic, of nationality on the one hand and ethnicity on the other. These similarities
shed some light on an issue that has been central in scholarly discussions
of nationality and nationalism. This is the contrast between voluntaristic
and deterministic definitions of the nation, or between civic and ethnic
criteria of membership. The debate has both a semantic and a normative
aspect. It concerns either what the word "nation" means, or what ways of
defining the nation are morally preferable.
In an 1882 lecture at Sorbonne on the subject "What is a Nation?,"
Ernest Renan, the famous French scholar, minimized the role of ethnicity
in his definition of the nation.4'7 To Renan, the nation is "a continuous
plebiscite:" 48
A large collection of men, sound in spirit and warm in their hearts,
create a moral self-consciousness [une conscience morale] which
is called a nation. As long as this moral consciousness shows its
effectiveness through sacrifices involved in individual self-denial
for the sake of the good of the
community, it will be legitimate,
49
it will have the right to exist.
Renan takes his voluntaristic stance to imply that ethnicity could not be
an intelligible basis for claims about nationhood. One reason is that he,
like many other thinkers in his time, assumes that ethnic groups are
something like racial categories. According to Renan, the irrelevance of
"ethnographic categories" is shown by the fact that all the major European nations are of "mixed ... blood"; for instance, Italians are made up
of "Gauls, Etruscans, Pelasgians, Greeks, not to mention other elements
... in an undecipherable mixture."50 Having dismissed race as a classify46.
Pirttijdrvi, supra note 28. The author is quoting Jacinto Arias, The "Numinous"
World of the Maya 7 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
47.
ERNEST RENAN, Qu'est-ce Qu'Une Nation? (1882), in OEUVRES COMPLtTES DE
ERNEST RENAN

48.
49.
50.

887 (1947).

In French, "un plbiscite de tous les jours." Id. at 904.
Id. at 906 (author's translation).
Id. at 896 (author's translation).
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ing principle, Renan argues in the following section for the irrelevance
of language-becauselanguage does not coincide with race.5 This puzzling argument is, perhaps, a symptom of the hold that ideas of race had
on academics at the time.
Contemporary anthropologists used the length of the skulls of individuals as a central-and supposedly scientific-basis for their
classification into races.52 Renan toys with the consciously absurd idea of
establishing separate states for the long-headed and broad-headed elements in Europe. He also imagines an anthropologist measuring the skull
of a war veteran (presumably an Alsatian from the Franco-Prussian war
of 1870-71), and then telling him: "You have made a mistake; you have
shed your blood for this cause. You were thinking that you were a Celt;
but actually, you are Germanic."53 Further, he suggests that research
might show ten years54 later that the man was racially neither a German
nor a Celt but a Slav.
The absurdity of Renan's thought experiment is due to its implicit
suggestion that a person's loyalties-a matter of active commitmentcould be dictated by something to which he is completely indifferent.55
The general lesson is that any attribute of individuals-such as descent,
language, or religion-will be relevant for their national affiliation only
if the individuals themselves think it is relevant; in other words, if this
relevance is somehow shown in their ways of life. The final court of appeal is "man, his desires, his needs. 56
It is important that Renan was writing in the wake of the FrancoPrussian war of 1870-71. France had lost the region of Alsace-Lorraine/
Elsass-Lothringen, an area whose inhabitants spoke forms of German
(today increasingly classified as independent Germanic languages rather
than dialects) but were politically loyal to France. His listeners would
know he was referring to this conflict when he suggested that populations of contested areas should decide which country they should belong
to for themselves.
Similar arguments may apply today when territories are carved
along supposedly ethnic lines. Many of us are skeptical of the sudden
Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 887. See, e.g. II THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 113 (11th ed., 1910)
(definition of 'Anthropology').
RENAN, supra note 47, at 899.
53.
Id. at 887.
54.
55.
Renan might of course have discussed the role of some more conspicuous racial
characteristic such as skin color. But even if racism is influential in many walks of life, I
imagine few racists would actually be enthusiastic about creating a nation where skin color is
the only criterion of membership. Biological characteristics are used to exclude someone from
an existing community, but on their own they do not create communities.
56.
RENAN, supra note 47, at 905.

51.
52.
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"discovery," after years of peaceful coexistence and intermarriage-if
you can speak of intermarriage where neither of the parties think they are
marrying outside their own group---that the Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians of Bosnia belonged to three self-contained cultural
spheres "traditionally" engaged in mortal combat.
On the other hand, neither the fact that language and religion are unimportant in many situations of political relevance, nor the fact that
manipulative politicians sometimes exploit them, can be taken to show
that language and religion can never be relevant for the definition of nationhood. If the final appeal is "man, his wishes, his needs"-then you
must simply ask them what they think is important-and thus the question of the relative importance of religion or language cannot be solved a
priori.
Renan's argument shows, rather, that the individuals' actual practices
of treating certain issues as something they share with a particular group
of others are what settle the question. The actual role of ethnicity in the
formation of such practices must, then, be an empirical issue.
Renan's skepticism about ethnic criteria of nationality would be justified if ethnicity were only attributed to individuals from the outside, as
a supposedly objective discovery by ethnologists. But I have already argued that it is more fruitful to define ethnicity as an umbrella term for
cultural features and patterns of association that in fact establish social
affiliations and divisions. In other words, if we agree that there are different ethnic groups in a society, then we have already agreed that there
will be divisions in some contexts. These may or may not be pervasive
enough to be justly called national divisions.
Renan is in fact sufficiently nuanced at least in part to concede this
possibility, despite his official adherence to the principle of political
rather than ethnic nationhood. The nation is constituted, he claims, by
two circumstances that actually amount to the same thing.
The one lies in the past, the other in the present. The one is the
common inheritance of rich memories; the other is the consent
of the present generation, its wish to live together, its wish for all
future to uphold the undivided inheritance that it has received. 7
This quote shows two things. Renan thinks of the nation as in some
sense a voluntary creation. But he realizes that individual choice is not
exercised in a vacuum: "Man, Messieurs, does not improvise."58 We are
born into a historical situation with already defined, shared cultural and
political spaces at our disposal. In a given historical situation language
57.
58.

Id. at 903-04.
Id. at 904.
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may be of importance: "language invites union; it does not force union."'5 9
The crucial question about the role of ethnicity is, then, not whether
there are divisions, because that question is already settled. Rather, one
should investigate whether these divisions in a given society imply significant differences in the citizens' relation to the state.
B. Ethnic Minorities and the State
The existing connections between ethnicity and nationality are due
to the requirement that the political space of a nation must be shared.
Each member of the community should in some relevant sense (a sense
agreed to be relevant) have the same kind of access to what is shared. As
Rousseau puts it, in order for the general will to be general, unanimity is
not required, but every vote must count. 6° If the voice of some group in
society is systematically silenced, then that group will in certain ways
cease to be part of the society.
This may happen in at least two ways. Perhaps a group or a region
financially receives less than its fair share of the common resources. Or
perhaps political debate on the whole tends to look at things from the
point of view of just one group or region while the experiences of others
are marginalized. One obvious reaction is for those excluded to press for
recognition as full-fledged parts of the nation. Civil rights movements
have this aim. But even avowedly secessionist movements may in fact
result from already existing exclusive practices by the majority. The activists typically claim that the group they represent has in effect already
been excluded from the shared space of the nation.
Conflicting tendencies among ethnic minorities and majorities need
consideration. Members of minorities may accuse the state of deliberately suppressing their distinctiveness. In other cases, on the contrary,
members of a culturally distinct group who wish to be part of the main
body of the nation feel they are discriminated against. Members of the
majority, on the other hand, frequently accuse the minority of being free
riders, of refusing to assimilate into the mainstream while still wanting
to enjoy the benefits of full membership. To some extent these points
apply both to ethnic and other (for instance, sexual) minorities. One
should recognize, however, that ethnic minorities may face issues that
cannot simply be absorbed into a general wave of identity politics.
First of all, ethnic differences are often language differences. But
language is essential in more or less every social activity. For this reason,
a large number of otherwise unconnected issues may have an ethnic
59.

Id. at 899.

60.

Rousseau 1997, supra note 5, bk. II, ch. I, at 58 n.1.
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aspect. The recommended class size at schools, urban sprawl, roads,
reservoirs and power plants, administrative boundaries, real estate
prices-all may have radical effects on one's chances to use and make
oneself understood in one's own language. The fear that the living space
of one's language might disappear because of immigration is not simply
a version of the narrow-minded wish not to live in a mixed
neighborhood. Rather, it concerns the very survival of a language as a
natural medium of social life. In contrast, immigration does not typically
affect one's chances to be gay or lesbian. These considerations apply to
regional ethnic minorities. Such minorities may demand regional
autonomy or secession. An ethnic group with a territory of its own can
try to constitute itself as a nation.
Many of the points raised in this article apply mainly to historical
(autochthonous) regional minorities. The case of diasporas or minorities
with an immigrant background is somewhat different. Most immigrant
minorities cannot realistically opt for secession as a solution. But a condition all ethnic minorities share is their potentially troubled relation to
the predominant nation in the state where they live.
For reasons already given, it will not be possible, in conclusion, to
say very much a prioriabout exactly which groups should count as ethnic minorities. The central point is rather that the question is answered
by looking into actual patterns of interaction between groups in a given
society. These patterns, rather than objective attributes of individuals,
settle the question.
It is also clear that some groups will have more well-grounded
claims than others to cultural distinctiveness. Similarly, some may advance better cases than others for compensations for past injustices.
Again, such issues must be addressed on a case-by-case basis rather than
a priori. It will also not be possible to give definite guidelines about
when secession will be justified. But there is at least a minimum requirement, the role of which Elizabeth Anscombe once compared to the
role of absolute zero in physics. 6' A government that declares a group of
people as its enemies, to be exterminated like vermin, cannot, by definition, at the same time represent the very same people. If the group in
question inhabits a distinct territory there will be a clear case for secession. Specifically, one may consider repeated statements by the present
Russian administration, including President Putin, on the subject of
Chechnya.62 There is also a strong case, but perhaps not an equally com61.
G.E.M. Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority of the State, 20 RATIO 1 (1978),
reprinted in ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 130, 155 (1981).
62.
MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, THE CHECHEN WARS: WILL RUSSIA GO THE WAY OF THE
SOVIET UNION? 70, 74-75 (2002).
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pelling one, when a government merely singles out a minority culture as
alien and detrimental to the nation as a whole.
CONCLUSION

Neither nationality nor ethnicity can be understood in terms of objective attributes of individuals only. Rather, they are forms of human
association. Thus they are dependent on the fact that the group members
themselves understand their relations to each other in a certain way. Like
civic association, national and ethnic belonging concern the ways in
which human beings share something with each other. In all three cases,
a common language of symbols must be involved in the creation of a
political and cultural shared space.
For this reason, questions about cultural unity and diversity belong
to the very fabric of political life in a democratic society. They arise
naturally from the requirement that the political space of a nation must
be shared. The situation of ethnic, national, and indigenous minorities
cannot be properly understood without considering their (sometimes
troubled) relation to the nation state. Exactly how to settle such issues
(i.e. how to respond to demands for autonomy or secession), however,
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

